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STATE OF UTAH 
GREAT SALT LAKE AUTHORITY 
' Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ISLAND RANCHING COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10395 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
The statement of this case and its facts, as presented 
by Appellant in its main Brief and acknowledged as ac-
curate in Respondent's Brief, is the basis for this Reply. 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
In compliance with Rule 75(p) (2), it is intended that 
this Reply Brief will meet and respond only to Points, 
issues and defenses raised by Respondent in its answering 





THE GSLA ACT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY IN-
VALID FOR ITS FAILURE TO DEFINE OR 
DELIMIT THE JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDAR-
IES OF GSLA. 
At the outset, Respondent does not deny the proposi-
tion that to sustain the constitutionality of 65-8-1 thru 9, 
U.C.A. 1953 as amended, the Statute must define the terri-
torial boundaries of GSLA. That point is, in fact, admitted. 
Resp. Br., p. 3. It is merely argued that any required ter-
ritorial definition is clearly set out in 65-8-1 as the "Great 
Salt Lake and its environs". Resp. Br., p. 3. Several rea-
sons are given for that conclusion. This Reply will focus 
upon those reasons not otherwise discussed in our main 
Brief. 
Respondent's assertion that 65-8-1 defines the terri-
torial boundaries of GSLA as the "Great Salt Lake and its 
environs" is erroneous. A fair reading of that Section does 
not at all reveal the boundaries of the Agency. 65-8-1 re-
lates solely to the selection of Agency members and to that 
end only, it provides that appointment shall be made of 
those who have an interest in and understanding of the 
"Great Salt Lake and its environs". Such reference falls 
short of a jurisdictional boundary. Nor does any other 
Section of the Statute employ the term as a territorial defi-
nition. 
The basis for Respondent's argument is divisible in 
four parts. They are : 
[ 1] That although the term "the Lake and its en-
virons" is indeterminate, its significance is easily ascer-
tainable by reference to the title of the Statute which re-
fers to the "surveyed meander" of the Lake. Since the 
meaning of the phrase "Great Salt Lake and its environs" 
and "surveyed meander" are one and the same, ergo the 
jurisdictional boundary of GSLA is "the Lake and its en-
virons". Resp. Br., pp. 3, 6, 7. 
The worst enemy this argument has is itself. To begin 
with, it relies upon the title to fix the boundary and pre-
sumes the same to be part of the substantive legislation, 
entitled to such rank in a constitutional interpretation of 
the Statute. Such presumption accords the title a much 
greater station than the precedent gained of this Court wilJ 
allow. The law is clear under Donahue v. Warner Bros. 
Picture D?"stributing Corp., 2 U. 2d 256, 272 P. 2d 177 
(1954) that the title is not the enacted law, it cannot serve 
in that role and further, that its function is only to assist 
in interpreting the enacted law. Respondent's argument 
disregards Donahue because the title is used not merely as an 
auxiliary in interpreting the statutory boundaries of GSLA, 
it becomes the very boundary itself. Respondent's entire 
argument of constitutional validity hinges upon it. That 
the case law is unique which holds that this constitutional 
requirement may be furnished by the title to the law, is 
supported by the fact that Respondent has not cited any 
authority in its Brief. 
Furthermore, even were this Court to conclude that 
the title to the GSLA Statute may supply the jurisdictional 
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boundary, Respondent's argument is yet invalid because 
the Statute is clear that the terms "the Great Salt Lake and 
its environs" and the "surveyed meander" are not synono-
mous. Both terms are used side by side in 65-8-6 ( 8) : 
"The Authority shall not receive revenues 
which accrue to the state land board from mineral 
leases or mineral removal from state owned lands 
and waters within the Great Salt Lake Meander 
Line established by the United States Surveyor 
General. All other revenues, including such amounts 
as may be made available by the legislature, shall be 
reserved for use in the development and adminis-
tration of the Great Salt Lake and its environs by 
the Authority." 
The plain meaning of this Section is that the "surveyed 
meander" is somewhere within or without but not the same 
as the "Great Salt Lake and its environs." Such conclusion 
is irresistible because if the two terms were equivalent and 
interchangeable as contended by Respondent, one but not 
both would have been set out in 65-8-6 ( 8). The other 
would have been quite unnecessary. Thus, Respondent's 
attempt to save the Statute by relying upon the title (sur-
veyed meander) , to explain the meaning of the term "the 
Great Salt Lake and its environs" is futile because that title 
refers to a different and independent area. 
[2] Respondent argues that a more precise jurisdic-
tional boundary than the "Lake and its environs" would 
have been for the Legislature, "impractical and needlessly 
confusing." Resp. Br. pp. 7, 33. That is a rather difficult 
stand when weighed against the almost legendary rule that 
the due process clause requires that a statute notify every-
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one of their rights and liabilities under it, and how their 
property will be affected by it. Conally v. General Con-
struction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 46 S. Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed. 322; 
State of Utah V. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P. 2d 561 
(1952); McDougall v. Lueder, 389 Ill. 141, 58 N. E. 2d 899 
( 1945). How such due process requirement is satisfied in 
this case is not made apparent by Respondent's argument. 
[3] The driving force of Respondent's argument is 
best seen in its Brief where having claimed that the "sur-
veyed meander" has something to do with the jurisdictional 
boundary, it is admitted as fact that the Lake meander has 
never been completely surveyed. Resp. Br., pp. 6, 7. Thus, 
the alleged boundary becomes no boundary at all, it being 
left open and undefined in unsurveyed areas. To avoid this 
pitfall, Respondent asks this Court on page 7 "to judicially 
li'mit GSLA to those areas of the Lake where the meander 
has been surveyed". Such a request has no parallel in any 
decision of this Court or of any other court, nor does Re-
spondent make note of any. The argument is met immedi-
ately by the principle that this Court will not pose as a 
sort-of secondary legislature, it will not re-write a statute 
and it will not supply what the Legislature left out. Moun-
tain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 107 Utah 
502, 155 P. 2d 184 (1945). Such request would have this 
Court and not the Legislature fix the limits of GSLA's 
jurisdiction. The impending result forecasts the folly of 
the argument. As the survey of the Lake's meander pro-
gresses, further announcements from this Court will be re-
quired with respect to the effect of that survey on the 
already judicially established jurisdictional boundary of 
GSLA. On and on, the Court would subsequently find itself 
defining and limiting territorial boundaries. Such ad hoc 
legislation from this Court is far removed from the state-
ment of Cardozo, J., in Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U. S. 20 
(1933), "that we take this Statute as we find it". 
[ 4] Lastly, Respondent argues that the fact the Lake 
meander has never been completely surveyed is irrelevant, 
because GSLA in seeking to condemn Antelope Island is 
not "exercising any jurisdiction in any unsurveyed area of 
the Lake". Resp. Br., pp. 7, 22, 30. The principle over-
looked by that statement is that for the purpose of de-
termining whether a statute is constitutionally inadequate 
because of the lack of jurisdictional boundaries, the statute 
is to be construed in its entirety and not in segmented parts. 
North Titanic Mining Co. v. Crockett, 75 Utah 259, 284 P. 
328 (1929). Either the Statute defines the jurisdictional 
boundaries of GSLA or it does not. If it does not, the Act 
must fail and it is of no moment that Antelope Island is 
otherwise mentioned in the unconstitutional statute or that 
the Island lies in a surveyed area of the Lake. If the Statute 
is invalid in part, it is presumptively invalid in whole un-
less it contains a "severability clause". Thfokol Chemical 
Corp. v. Morrison County Tax Board, 184 A. 2d 75 (N. J. 
1962). As indicated by this Court in Union Trust Company 
v. Simmons, 116 Utah 422, 211 P. 2d 190 (1949), the ques-
tion of severability is primarily one of legislative intent. 
The wandering and vagrant nature of the GSLA Statute 
is evidence that the constitutionality of the Law should be 
measured as a whole and not in selected or isolated portions. 
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The presumption of constitutionality of this Act as 
claimed by Respondent, vanishes with the invalidity of the 
arguments which Respondent has presented in its Brief to 
sustain the same. 
POINT III. 
THE GSLA ACT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY IN-
VALID BECAUSE OF UNLAWFUL DELEGA-
TION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND 
STANDARDS. 
The nub of Respondent's argument on this Point is 
that under the modern view, wide latitude is given to the 
construction of statutes which vest discretion in adminis-
trative agencies. Broad statements of legislative policy 
along with authority to adopt administrative rules and 
regulations is all, according to Respondent, that is neces-
sary to satisfy the constitutional mandate that legislative 
power cannot be delegated. Thus, the claim goes that the 
statement in the Act that GSLA shall "administer and de-
velop the Lake and its environs" when taken with agency 
rule-making power, provides sufficient constitutional stand-
ards and safeguards, since the variety and complexity of 
the GSLA program advises against any greater particular-
ity. Resp. Br., pp. 11, 12, 14, 15. A look at the principles 
laid down by this Court in Rowell v. State Bd. of Agricul-
ture, 98 Utah 353, 99 P. 2d 1 (1940) and State v. Packard, 
122 Utah 369, 250 P. 2d 561 (1952) on the necessity of 
administrative standards in legislation, as well as the speci-
fication of duties and functions contained in the enabling 
statutes of similar Utah administrative agencies, quickly 
reveals the weakness of such argument. For the most part, 
the main Brief of Appellant (pp. 15-21) is a rebuttal to 
this contention of Respondent. 
There is one part of Respondent's argument, however, 
that should not pass without mention. Its position that the 
phrase "administer and develop" places the Act beyond 
constitutional attack because of vagueness, indefiniteness, 
and unlawful legislative delegation, rests upon two deci-
sions from other jurisdictions, Schecter v. Killingsworth, 
(Ariz.) and In Re Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project, 
(Cal.) which Respondent claims are the leading authorities 
on the legislative delegation issue. Before much stock is 
put in this contention, the statutes under consideration in 
Schecter and Bunker Hill should be examined. 
In Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 373, 380 P. 2d 
136 (1963), the Supreme Court of Arizona had before it 
for review the Arizona Financial Responsibility Act. A 
codification of the Uniform Financial Responsibility Law 
and consisting of better than 80 sections, the Act described 
in great detail the duties, responsibilities and realm of 
authority of the administrative official charged with its en-
forcement. It was urged therein, among other things, that 
the Act was unconstitutional because it conferred upon the 
administrator quasi-judicial powers. Noting that the Uni-
form Law had withstood similar constitutional attack in 
four other jurisdictions, the Arizona Court upheld the law, 
holding that the Act contained definite standards for legis-
lative action and that delegation of quasi-judicial power did 
not violate the separation-of-powers principle. That such 
case under its facts could have achieved any other result , , 
would have been little short of remarkable. No claim was 
made in Schecter, as is made in the case at bar, that the 
Financial Responsibility Act was without ascertainable 
standards and safeguards or that a property owner could 
not determine the effect of the Act upon his property 
rights. Furthermore, while there was tested in the Schecter 
case a Uniform Law, many times sustained, we have our 
doubts that any court has had brought before it a statute 
of a parallel to the GSLA Act. 
Respondent contends that the facts and holding in 
Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project 1-B v. Goldman, 37 
Cal. Rptr. 74, 389 P. 2d 538 (1964), are "particularly in 
point" and present a "situation identical to the situation" 
before this Court. In that case, the California Supreme 
Court was, along with other issues, concerned with the 
constitutionality of the California Urban Renewal Act. 
(Parenthetically, the Utah Urban Redevelopment Law, 11-
15-1 thru 152. U.C.A., is largely patterned thereafter.) 
True enough, the California Act provided for the develop-
ment and redevelopment of real property within the urban 
area. But that is where the similarity ends between it and 
the GSLA Act. The meticulousness and almost painstaking 
care with which the California Act describes the duties, 
responsibilities, functions, procedures, and limits of ad-
ministrative authority cannot be readily described. With 
an almost microscopic eye, the Act defines the jurisdictional 
boundaries of the urban agency, its powers, bonding re-
quirements, limitations on development plans and projects, 
contractual responsibilities, a step-by-step course to be fol-
lowed in the urban development project, an owner-partici-
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pant plan, the extent to which private property rights can 
be affected, and numerous other administrative assign-
ments and limitations. Cal. Stats. Health §33792, §33707, 
§33260-280. It takes more than 160 sections to define the 
powers and duties of an urban agency under the Act. Upon 
review of such specific provisions, the California Court 
concluded that the Act could not be seriously challenged as 
an unlawful delegation of legislative power. Under such a 
systematic specification of administrative standards, our 
quarrel is not with the decision rendered in Bunker Hill, 
but with Respondent's claim that its facts present a "situa-
tion identical to the situation" in the GSLA Act. 
So it is that Respondent hangs its argument upon 
Schecter and Bunker Hill in saying that the words "admin-
ister and develop" in the GSLA Act satisfy the principle of 
unlawful legislative delegation. How those decisions can 
be compared with the facts of the instant suit is not at all 
evident. The very nature of the statutes in the Schecter 
and Bunker Hill cases make those rulings wholly irrelevant 
to and of no authority in the immediate appeal. If Re-
spondent's argument is worth its salt, it is so for other 
reasons than that given in those decisions. 
POINT IV. 
THE GSLA ACT DOES NOT GRANT TO THE 
AGENCY POWER TO CONDEMN ANTELOPE 
ISLAND. 
There are several arguments which Respondent makes 
on this Point in its Brief which necessitate a reply. The 
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thread of its claim that the Act does grant to GSLA the 
power to condemn Antelope Island does not attempt to 
diagnose the meaning of 65-8-6 ( 10) wherein it is provided 
that with respect to the Island, GSLA is authorized to se-
cure the same solely by "donation, purchase agreement, 
lease, or other lawful means". Rather, Respondent contends 
that the "implication" of the Statute confers upon the 
Agency the power of eminent domain as to Antelope Island 
as well as other properties within the jurisdictional boun-
daries (whatever those boundaries are). Resp. Br., pp. 
20, 29, 31. The factors which are said to support that claim 
are the subject of this rebuttal. 
[1] The trouble with Respondent's theory is that 
"implications" have nothing to do with the construction of 
statutes involving the power to condemn property. The 
power is either specifically or unequivocally granted or it 
is withheld. The great body of case law in this country, 
including that of this Court, is witness to the principle 
that there is no such thing as condemnation by implication 
in the enforcement of state statutes. See Bertagnoli v. 
Baker, 117 Utah 348, 215 P. 2d 626 (1950), and other 
authorities cited in App's. main Brief, pp. 22-27. Also see 
McMechan v. Board of Education, 157 Ohio St. 241, 105 N. 
E. 2d 270. Such principle is underpinned not only by the 
rationale of the past, it is in the nature of constitutional 
government as we now know it, an almost inherent pre-
script. 
[ 2] Respondent argues on pages 27-29 of its Brief 
that the issue herein of the right of GSLA to condemn 
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Antelope Island is "mitigated to the point of complete 
elimination" by the Act itself. That is so, it is said, because 
65-8-6 (7) contains procedural safeguards which require 
that GSLA exercise the eminent domain power in accord-
ance with the general laws of Utah on eminent domain 78-, 
34-1 et seq., U.C.A. 1953. Portions of 78-34-4 regarding 
factors to be shown in any condemnation suit, i. e., public 
use, necessity, etc., are then reviewed by Respondent. Resp. 
Br., p. 28. Somehow the conclusion is drawn therefrom 
that because of the "limitation" that the general eminent 
domain laws place on GSLA's discretion, the power is 
granted in the GSLA Act to expropriate Antelope Island. 
The argument thus made by Respondent does not ap-
preciate the issue raised by Appellant before this Court. 
The question posed is not whether the eminent domain 
power has been exercised properly herein for a public and 
necessary use. It is the more fundamental question of 
whether the power exists, at all, to exercise with respect to 
Antelope Island. We are concerned not with an arbitrary 
execution of the condemnation power on the Island as Re-
spondent suggests, but with the authenticity of the power, 
the thing itself. Respondent's argument glides right over 
the issue present in this appeal. 
Even were such argument relevant to the issue on re-
view, it is of no help to the infirmity of Respondent's posi-
tion. Notwithstanding the specific reference in the GSLA 
Act to the general eminent domain statute, it is well ac-
cepted and this Court has so held that 78-34-1 et seq. is 
implementive of Article I, Section 22, Utah Constitution, 
and that all suits brought to condemn private property are 
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subject to those provisions. Board of Education of Logan 
City V. Croft, 13 U. 2d 310, 373 P. 2d 697 (1962); State 
Road Commission v. Salt Lake City Board of Educatwn, 13 
U. 2d 56, 368 P. 2d 468 (1962). 
[3] On pages 29-31 of its Brief, Respondent makes 
its closing argument on the issue of the right to condemn. 
It is contended that to interpret the Act so as to deny 
GSLA the power to condemn Antelope Island while recog-
nizing such power as to other lands within the jurisdic-
tional boundaries, would "grant special immunities and 
privileges" to the owners of the Island and render the Act 
as special legislation in violation of Article 6, Section 
26(16), Utah Constitution. Since the Legislature could not 
have intended such unconstitutional consequences, it is said 
that the Act must be construed so as to grant the power to 
condemn Antelope Island. 
There are several reasons why this phase of Respon-
dent's argument is without merit: 
A. The biggest difficulty with this theory is that it 
assumes that under the argument advanced by 
Appellant herein, the owners of Antelope Island 
would be granted special immunity and privileges. 
For that purpose, it focuses attention upon what 
is given or granted by the Act to the owners of 
the Island. That is where the difficulty lies. The 
query is not what the Act grants to the owners of 
the Island but rather, what did the Legislature 
delegate and grant to GSLA regarding the con-
demnation of Antelope Island. The contention that 
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the Legislature did so delegate and grant the 
power must be won by an affirmative finding to 
that effect in the Act, and not by twisting the 
issue to say that unless GSLA is determined to 
have the power as to Antelope Island, the Statute 
is unconstitutional. The Act grants nothing to 
the owners of the Island. 
B. Since the power of eminent domain is one of strict 
delegation by the Legislature, it may be granted 
or withheld as to specific property, properties or 
regions. The Legislature, in creating the power 
where none had previously existed, may place re-
strictions upon it and the administrative agency, 
GSLA, takes the power subject to those restric-
tions. McElrath V. United States, 102 U. S. 426 
(1880). This Court may judicially notice the 
Statute of some years past authorizing the Utah 
State Engineering Commission to condemn prop-
erty for "This is the Place Monument" in Salt 
Lake County. Laws of Utah, 1951, Special Ses-
sion. The eminent domain power was therein 
granted only as to particular property and with-
held as to other lands, all of which lay within the 
monument site. The GSLA Act achieves the same 
result in 65-8-6 ( 10) by authorizing the acquisition 
of Antelope Island by "donation, purchase agree-
ment, lease, or other lawful means", exclusive of 
the condemnation power which is granted as to 
other lands under 65-8-6 ( 1) . 
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C. Not one case is cited by Respondent as authority 
for the proposition that a Statute which grants to 
an administrative agency power to condemn cer-
tain lands and withholds the power as to other 
property within the territorial boundaries, is un-
constitutional as special legislation. Lorenz et al. 
V. Campbell, 110 Vt. ____ , 3 A. 2d 548 (1939), cited 
by Appellant on page 30 of its Brief, involved a 
condemnation statute as to particular property, 
which under Respondent's theory, should have 
been declared unconstitutional as granting special 
immunity and privilege to others. It was not so 
held. 
D. The claim that Respondent has been granted 
power to condemn Antelope Island because "the 
GSLA Act is unconstitutional if the power has not 
been granted", is a non-sequitur. Respondent can 
neither sustain its right to condemn the Island, 
nor the constitutionality of the GSLA Act by such 
a "bootstrap" doctrine. If the Act is special leg-
islation as suggested by Respondent, it is merely 
another cornerstone, in addition to those raised 
by Appellant in Points II and III of this Appeal, 
to a determination that the Statute is, in law, 
constitutionally unenforceable. That being the 
case, the entire Act would fail, it being not sever-
able one paragraph from another. 
The fundamental issue raised by Appellant in this Point 
has gone unanswered by Respondent. That issue is : what 
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meaning is to be given to 65-8-6(10) which provides that 
Antelope Island may be acquired only by "donation, pur-
chase agreement, lease, or other lawful means". The em-
ployment by Appellant of two canons of construction to re-
solve the uncertainty in the above-referenced section of the 
phrase "or other lawful means", has not been attacked by 
Respondent in its Brief, save to say that such interpretive 
aids cannot be used to defeat the "clear legislative intent". 
Resp. Br. p. 19. That argument only begs the question how-
ever, because it is to determine the "clear legislative intent" 
that the canons of construction are utilized. 
Respondent's Brief is in total default on the stand of 
Appellant in Point IV (3), pp. 33-36 of the main Brief, 
that the special means of acquisition of Antelope Island set 
forth in 65-8-6 ( 10) controls and takes precedence over the 
general means of acquiring property set out in 65-8-6 ( 1). 
If, as Respondent contends, the Legislature intended that 
the acquisition of Antelope Island was to be governed by 
the general clause in 65-8-6 (1), why then did the Legis-
lature designate as the only means, "donation, purchase 
agreement, lease or other lawful means", in referring to 
the Island in 65-8-6(10)? Are we to presume that the Leg-
islature was engaged in a mere penmanship exercise when it 
wrote the means of acquiring Antelope Island into 65-8-
6 (10)? That is the presumption which this Court must 
make if Respondent's argument is adopted. It is to hold 
that the entire second sentence of 65-8-6 (10) is of no legal 
significance, that it is legislative surplusage, and that the 
power of Respondent to condemn Antelope Island is to be 
measured as though that sentence were not part of the law 
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at all. Such a result emasculates the Statute as well as all 
canons of statutory construction. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent says that Appellant's reading of the GSLA 
Act is mechanical, inflexible, and does not realize the spirit 
of the law. The short answer to that assertion is that about 
all with which this Court and the parties have to work is 
the ordinary meaning of the English language. If this 
Court must read between line~ to realize the spirit of the 
law, if it must interpolate in what has been left out, or if 
it must read out what is plainly in, then the judicial proi-
cess has become one of impulse, as permanent as the fleet-
ing moment, and as changing as the personalities of men. 
If so, what then do we do with statements such as that IOf 
the late Felix Frankfurter when he said: 
"* * * A judge must not rewrite a statute, 
neither to enlarge nor to contract it. 
"An omission at the time of enactment, whether 
careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied 
however much later wisdom may recommend the 
inclusion. 
"But there are more fundamental objections to 
loose judicial reading. Their (the legislature's) re-
sponsibility is discharged ultimately by words. They 
are under a special duty therefore to observe that 
'Exactness in the use of words is the basis of all 
serious thinking. You will get nowhere without it.' " 
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of 
Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527 (1947). 
18 
The GSLA Act means what it says and it must be, for 
better or worse, interpreted as it was enacted and stands. 
The Statute is constitutionally unenforceable for failure to 
define jurisdictional boundaries and for unlawful delega-
tion of legislative standards and authority. In no event 
does the Act empower Respondent to condemn Antelope 
Island, the property of Appellant. 
The Complaint of Respondent should be accordingly 
dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR., 
of and for 
PARSONS,BEHLE,EVANS 
& LATIMER, 
520 Kearns Building., 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Attorney for AppeUant. 
